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PALESTINIANS' RIGHTS
The Palestinian people's resistance and "struggle for self-determination
and liberation," and that of its representative organ, the P.L.O., is thus
accorded a status in international law. In addition, their right to self-
determination is declared to be a "basic human ight." This right may be
most constructively interpreted as embracing a wide variety of methods
including the implementation of Palestinian rights through political-legal
techniques. It is significant that the resolution calls upon those states which
are committed to the ideals of freedom and peace to provide both moral
and material assistance. Consequently, such assistance may not be in-
terpreted as illegal acts of intervention.
These resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly provide the recog-
nition of the rights of the Palestinian people and the basis in international
legal authority for the Palestinians themselves and other concerned
members of the world community to take steps toward their implementation.
A workable conception of international law requires not only the for-
mulation of legal principles based upon justice, but also their effectuation.
In this respect, international law operates very much in the same way that
an individual operates in taking steps from ideas to words and then to
actions. The words set forth in international legal principles will remain
as vacuous and as misleading as Nixon's pre-1968 political rhetoric unless
they are recognized as applicable to particular entities and then practically
implemented through specific enforcement and sanctions. Yet, whether or
not effective sanctioning processes can be applied to achieve the recognized
rights of the Palestinian people through peaceful means based upon justice
under international law is another question. The impending Geneva Peace
Conference may render this justice to the Palestinian people, but not
unless they are represented by the P.L.O. as a principal to any negotiations
or treaties.
But if this justice does not come to the Palestinian people, whose tragic
plight has already challenged the integrity and credibility of the United
Nations and the legal principles which its Charter embodies, not only will
there be oil shortages, but also continual bloodbaths, arising from recurrent
instances of terror and violence, will befall Israel and its sympathetic
allies in the world community.
STEFAN TOLIN
The Civil Commitment Process
The Practising Law Institute has published a handbook entitled
Legal Rights of the Mentally Handicapped.' The work, as stated in its
foreword, strives to organize the most significant written materials avail-
B. J. ENNIS & P. R. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED
(Criminal Law and Urban Problems No. 57, 1973).
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able on a class that is one of society's most oppressed groups-the mentally
ill.
It is important that a lawyer, who is interested in the plight of the
mentally disturbed, understand the civil commitment process and the
rights of these people.
Herbert Silverberg states in The Civil Commitment Process: Basic
Considerations,2 that standards for civil commitment vary with the pur-
poses it is thought to serve. In other words, any mental commitment action
on the part of the state must be reasonably related to the achievement of
a legitimate and substantial governmental purpose. If the standards are
not reasonably related to the purposes to be served-if the law as designed
cannot achieve its stated objective-then the law may be unconstitutional. 3
In speaking of the legal status of patients, Silverberg points out that "vol-
untary, informal, and non-protesting status implies either a desire on the
patient's part or at least some degree of willingness on the patient's part
to be a patient." 4 Hence, as stated in the case of Shelton v. Tucker, "even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundmental per-
sonal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth
of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means
for achieving the same basic purpose." 5
In referring to the legal procedures involved in commitment, Silver-
berg points out that a few states provide for prompt judicial hearings into
the reasonableness of the seizure when one has been detained for commit-
ment. He cites the case of In re Barnard,6 which held that a patient was
entitled to an early judicial finding of probable cause in determining whether
he should be committed. The author also states that the sooner an attorney
makes his presence known to the patient and the authorities, the less
likely the patient will ultimately be committed. Silverberg notes that when
maximum-lawyer attention was devoted to testing the validity of the early
stages of hospitalization, the commitment rate dropped substantially. It
is important that the lawyer inform the client and the client's relatives
of the alternatives available; that the hospital personnel know of the law-
yer's involvement in the patient's case; that the patient's lawyer take
advantage of inspecting hospital records available to him and thoroughly
question hospital authorities as to his client's mental state.
Five significant due process rights will be discussed here, based on
Lawrence Schwartz's Civil Commitment Process: Established and Emer-
ging Rights.7 The rights to be discussed are: the right to counsel, the
2 Id. at 103-112.
3 Id. at 105.
4 Id. at 106.
5 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
6 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
7 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, supra note 1, at 113-29.
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CIVIL COMMITMENT
right to independent expert examinations, the right against self-incrimi-
nation, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to trial by jury.
Due process, in relation to persons subject to civil commitment,
means that one is entitled to notice, a hearing, and the right to be present
and establish a defense.8 The court in Lessard v. Schmidt held that mere
notice of the date, time, and place of a full hearing in a civil commitment
proceeding is not satisfactory. The person should be informed of the basis
for his detention, his right to jury trial, the standards upon which he may
be detained, the names of examining physicians and all other persons
who may testify in favor of his continued detention, and the substance of
their proposed testimony.9
Regarding the right to counsel, Lessard v. Schmidt stated that a person
detained on grounds of mental illness has a right to counsel and to have
counsel appointed if the individual is indigent. 10 Counsel is essential at
each stage of the proceeding in order to:
I. Explain and humanize the proceedings for the patients,
2. Investigate the case,
3. Assist and speak for the patient at hearings,
4. Exercise the right to jury trial and preliminary hearings,
5. Line up expert witnesses, produce evidence and attack false
assertions by the government,
6. Cross-examine government witnesses,
7. Prepare the patient and patient's witness to testify,
8. Advise the patient whether to contest the proceeding,
9. Prepare the patient for a commitment,
10. Investigate the government plan for treatment and suggest
alternatives. I I
In relation to waiver of the right to counsel, Johnson v. Zerbst stated
that "the sixth amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal
proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or
liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel." 2 Lawrence
Schwartz in his Civil Commitment Process,13 states that "the argument
against waiver of counsel is stronger in civil commitment proceedings
than in criminal indictments, given the allegations of mental instability
intrinsic to the proceedings." The court in Dooling v. Overholser noted
that "such a person (mentally ill) cannot be deemed by the courts to have
intelligently waived the statutory right to be represented by counsel.' 4
8 Id. at 115.
9 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
10 Id. at 1097.
" LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, supra note 1, at 117-18.
12 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
13 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, supra note 1, at 119.
14 243 F.2d. 825, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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Important to the patient and to the patient's counsel is the assistance of
an independent expert psychiatrist or psychologist. Where the patient is
an indigent, the expert should be provided at the expense of the government.
If there is a trial or hearing of the patient's case, the independent expert
is helpful in aiding the lawyer in effectively cross-examining the govern-
ment's experts; presenting testimony that the patient is not mentally ill,
or if ill not dangerous; and pointing out the difficulty in predicting danger-
ousness. The case of Dixon v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania held that the client is entitled to independent expert
examinations and assistance in preparation for the hearing, through court
appointment where the subject cannot afford to retain these services.' 5
Also, the court stated in Whalen v. U.S., "it may sometimes be impossible
for counsel to render effective assistance without an opportunity to consult
psychiatric experts in order to understand the requisites of examination
and to assess the meaning and reliability of diagnosis."' 6
Regarding the right against self-incrimination, the Lessard case stated,
"the patient should be told by counsel and the psychiatrist that he is going
to be examined with regard to his mental condition, that the statements
he may make may be the basis for commitment, and that he does not have
to speak to the psychiatrist.' 7 The question should be asked, "can it
be assumed that an individual subject to involuntary commitment is com-
petent to waive these rights?"
Schwartz notes that the majority of courts recently considering the
question of the government's burden of proof in civil commitment have
held that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is fundamental to due process.' 8
Furthermore, Schwartz points out that a few state statutes make pro-
visions for a right to jury trial in civil commitment, but the author is un-
aware of any judicial holding that this right is constitutional. Schwartz
states: "most of the arguments in support of this right can be adapted
from the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Mackeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania: 1. Deprivations of liberty in civil commitments are usually no less
and often greater in length than minor misdemeanors, for which there is
a constitutional right to jury trial, 2. The penal non-rehabilitative nature
of mental institutions are often indistinguishable or even worse than
criminal incarceration, necessitating the availability of all criminal rights
protections, 3. A jury would protect an individual from the bias and prej-
udice of an individual judge and reduce the margin of error."' 19
15 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
16 346 F.2d. 812, 823 (1965).
17 349 F. Supp. at 1101.
18 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, supra note I, at 127.
19 Id. at 128.
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Although existing statutes and court decisions grant to the mentally
ill: the right to counsel, the right to independent expert examinations,
the right to the privilege against self-incrimination, proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, and the right to trial by jury; these privileges are often abused
by indifferent parties. Contemporary lawyers have an obligation to make
sure that the mentally ill are accorded those rights deserving them.
LABAT YANCEY
Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act
Local administrative and governmental units of the several states in
recent years have found themselves party defendants in litigation involving
alleged violations of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.' Most cases have been
concerned with school desegregation, 2 discrimination in hiring or firing
by local school boards, 3 denial of due process, 4 and police brutality in
which the plaintiffs seek to hold the city or county ultimately liable.5
Whether these public entities are proper defendants, and if so, for what
forms of relief is one of the most unsettled technical problems in such liti-
gation.
The Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion by Justice Rehn-
quist 6 has attempted to settle the issue in its recent decision of the City
of Kenosha y. Peter G. Bruno.7
The issue has been whether the word "person" in § 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act includes a municipality, or governmental agency, or unit thereof
for legal or equitable relief. The Supreme Court in Bruno stated an emphatic
"no!"
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any state or territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
2 Wheeler and Spaulding v. Durham City Board of Education No. 5, Civil Nos. D-60
and C-116-D-60 (M.D.N.C.).
3 Harkless v. Sweeney, Ina. School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd 427
F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 91 S.Ct. 451 (1971).
City of Kenosha, Wisconsin v. Peter G. Bruno 93 S.Ct. 2222 (1973).
Carter v. Colson 477 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6 For connotation of this statement see Washington, Essays in Repression: First Term
Opinions of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 4 N.C.C.L.J. 53 (1972).
7 93 S.Ct. 2222 (1973).
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